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The present work intends to analyse the relation between the property structure as a 
corporate government variable and the levels of corruption. Empirical analysis will be 
held by two econometric models and the database comes from a questionnaire done 
by the World Bank to 606 enterprises, for the year 2005. Previous empirical evidence is 
limited and it has been a matter to consider to carry out the research. The results 
obtained show that a higher number of majority shareholders in the property, leads to 
higher levels of corruption. There is a significant percentage of the sales contracts for 
bribery. Also, the frequency in which payments for own benefits are carried out is 
reduced, revealing an inverse relation between corruption and percentage of majority 
shareholders. Also, negotiation with state agencies contribute to corruption. 
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The incidence of the property structure of the Spanish companies in 
the levels of corruption 
1. INTRODUCTION 
  
The current economic and financial crisis Spain is going through makes one think 
about the background that has maybe provoked this devastating situation, causing the 
enterprises to become closer each day to having to consider risk management. From 
the enterprise’s point of view, a proper risk management is vital for the adequate 
performance of the organisations.  
Currently, the CNMV has approved the Good Government Code so that listed 
companies, the motor of economy, perform an adequate management and 
transparency of their acts, offering trust to the shareholders and generating value to the 
business (CNMV, 2015).  This is why, one of the most important subject that is 
considered nowadays is the business management. Specifically, a good corporate 
government system implemented by the organisations is especially important, as 
depending on the techniques held the enterprise will be more transparent, will give 
more trust to the investors and thus, its market value will be greater (CAF, 2005). There 
are several research works about corporate government policies carried out by the 
firms, which evidence the positive relation between the implementation of policies 
against corruption and a greater number of independent consultants, diversity and size 
of the council (Frias, Rodriguez and Garcia, 2014), as well as more specific topics 
related to the administrative board’s structure and the efficiency of the enterprise 
(Rodriguez, Fernandez and Rodriguez, 2013). However, the lack of previous empirical 
evidence to these research works does not allow to obtain firm conclusions.  
A type of risk the enterprises have to face is the risk of fraud and specifically one of the 
government and society’s biggest concerns in the last years is corruption, as it is a 
worldwide problem. Corruption is present in every country of the world, in developed 
countries as well as in developing ones (ABC.es, 2014). In this line, there is research 
about how corruption affects the enterprise’s growth, like Nguyen and Van Dijk’s work 
(2012) published in the Journal of Banking and Finance in which the effect of corruption 
on private and public enterprises is distinguished, finding evidence of how corruption 
on private enterprises has a negative effect on its growth, in comparison to public 
enterprises whose grow would be greater. We must not forget all the corruption cases 
going on in our country, such as Barcenas, Terra Natura, Emarsa and many others that 
are also being investigated. If the corruption act is detected, it has negative effects on 
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the enterprises from fines and prison sentence to loss of business reputation, affecting 
its profitability. To avoid consequences, the organisations are carrying out control 
mechanisms implementing good government practices and giving the directives a 
positive image for their ethic behaviour (Frias et al. 2014). In fact, it is the public bodies 
who spot the problem and commit to take action. As the report of the fight against 
corruption of the EU issued by the European Commission point out (2014) “The  
Government has admitted the need to face corruption as a priority… it has adopted a 
Resolution over a wide range of actions to combat corruption”.  
In order to show the corruption level present in Spanish enterprises, a study of the 
results of a questionnaire made by the World Bank in 2005 has been done. As current 
data is limited, this date has been considered as it is previous to the crisis that began in 
2008 and it will allow us to see Spain’s previous corruption level. In next studies it 
would be interesting to compare the situation with the current one.  
The same way, through the before mentioned questionnaire, the Spanish enterprises 
property structure has been analysed as a key variable of corporate government 
implementing in the organisations. Taking into account that in Spain what prevails is 
the concentration of the property, a useful internal mechanism so that the investor and 
manager align their interests is, contrary to Anglo-Saxon countries where the 
mechanisms are external and scattered property prevails (Minguez and Martin, 2003), 
the property structure being at the same time a key variable of corporate government 
and that lacks of previous analysis about the relation with corruption.  This is why the 
present work will try to obtain empirical evidence about the relation of the property 
structure variables with corruption, as property structure can offer privileges, giving rise 
to act in corruptive ways. Thus, the present work’s purpose is to obtain evidence over 
the relation between corruption and the property structure for Spanish enterprises, to 
be able to know the background of the enterprises that have leaded to the current 
context of corruption at the same time.  
First of all, a descriptive analysis will be done over the variables related to property 
structure as a factor that influences the corporate government quality, like percentage 
of shares that the majority shareholders own, number of majority shareholders, sales 
percentage to the State and property gender. Specific features of the target enterprises 
that will be studied will also be taken into account, such as sector and the size of the 
business.  
Regards the way to measure corruption in Spain, the variables taken into account from 
the World Bank, will be the frequency in which the enterprises carry out payments o 
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presents to their workers and the percentage of sales contracts that they offer to the 
government. The research will be carried out by an econometric analysis with 
quantitative and qualitative variables. The sample conducted in 606 Spanish 
companies for the 2005 period, shows for one model that to have more than one 
majority shareholder in the enterprise, from a corporate government’s point of view, 
leads to higher corruption levels in contrast with the next model which shows an 
inverse relation between percentage of majority shareholders and corruption, with 
greater corruption indexes when negotiating with the public administration, having the 
manufacturing sector less incidence.  
The structure of this work will consist of, first, a theoretical framework where previous 
works done by other authors will be mentioned and where different corporate 
government variables will be taken into account, putting the variables to study into 
context. Then, the hypothesis will be established. Also, the importance of the corporate 
government’s role will be highlighted. Secondly, the methodology will be defined 
explaining the sample and the model chosen for the data analysis that will allow to 
verify if there is a relation between the variables or not. Third, data will be analysed and 
the results will be presented and interpreted. Finally, the most important points of the 
research and the study’s constraints will be mentioned and the possible research lines 
will be exposed.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The current crisis that Spain is facing has forced the enterprises to be transparent as a 
previous step to investors and different institutions relying on their corporations, as well 
as to generate business value.  This is why, transparency is considered a factor to be 
taken into account as corporate government technique. According to Díaz (2014); 
quoted by Urroz (2010) “Corporate transparency is a corporate government policy of a 
company, in charge of passing on information to the partnership about its commercial 
and finantial activities, its management, its results and contribution to the partnership 
through the Corporate Social Responsibility… it is a tool that allows a company to 
make known all the aspects that create value for it”. 
However, decisions regards the level of transparency are established by the owners 
whereas it is the senior management who put them into practice, and these are 
controlled by the administrative council. This is why, due to the agency conflicts that 
can exist between owners and the senior management derived from the separation of 
property and enterprises control, comes the necessity of creating a contract through 
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which the owner contracts and agent to manage the organisation in exchange for 
remuneration. The owner contracts the manager in order for this one to generate 
business value. The conflict will come when the interests of the owners geared to the 
maximisation of the benefits long term, are different to the manager’s, who wants short 
term benefits as well as to be well seen by his acts. There is also an information 
asymmetry, which makes the agent be able to act by his own part behind the owner’s 
back having an opportunistic behaviour. Argument according to the agency theory of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Another way of supervising and controlling the management is the Administrative 
Board, which according to Minguez and Martin (2003): “The Administrative Board is 
considered the last body in the internal control. Shareholders can incite the senior 
management to behave according to their interests. This way, the council can name, 
fire and establish the advisors remuneration, as well as the general guidelines and 
actions that the senior management should follow in their professional performance. 
One of the Administrative Board’s roles is to ensure the minority shareholders interests. 
One of the biggest problems in Spain are the problems between minority and majority 
shareholders. 
A concept to consider as a key aspect in corporate government is the property 
structure, as according to this, the shareholders will have one type of influence or 
another on controlling the senior management (Core, Holthausen, Larcker, 1999; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). When talking about property structure we mean if it is 
concentrated in few shareholders or if it is dispersed, as well as if it is in the family’s 
hands or of external investors. Previous literature gives evidence of how the property 
structure affects decisions on transparency, concluding that when the business 
property is in few people’s hands, this means, its structure is concentrated, then the 
need of giving information about how the company is working is smaller, because it can 
have consequences on its reputation and on the company’s long term development 
(Wang, 2006). 
Basing the literature review on the regulations, according to the Organisation of the 
economic and cooperation development (from now on OECD), who issued the 
corporative government principles in 1999 for the first time and that have been 
reviewed in 2004 and recently updated in 2015, in which the next concepts regards 
property structure are remarkable: A) Principle 20. The minority shareholder’s interests 
will be safeguarded from the shareholders who are in possession of major control and 
will have equal treatment in the property area. B) Principle 32. This one establishes the 
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shareholders rights such as the selection of the administrative board members. This 
last one, is the supervisor body of the senior management as it is through these that 
the shareholders will check the shares done by the seniors, as well as they will 
establish the remuneration system. 
These principles offer a guide so that the enterprises act according to the business 
ethics. Following the research line, the accomplishment of principle 20 reduces the 
majority shareholders excess of power allowing those who are in possession of less 
control to be able to exercise the rights they have. It is in the practise where the 
problem main-main arises (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2004; Young, Ahlstrom, 
Bruton and Jian, 2008) characterized by the fact that the shareholders who have major 
control exercise at the same time as senior management, and also, control the 
administrative board. As a consequence, remunerations and benefits not linked to the 
organisation are established, whereas, the minority shareholder remains basically not 
linked to the enterprise. This creates the existence of a possibility to commit fraudulent 
acts in own benefit of those who have major control. On the other hand, principle 32 
focuses on avoiding the senior management to participate in the administrative board 
avoiding the power abuse, that they sometimes use in own benefit. 
Several research defend the negative relation between the executive president and the 
general director, due to the existence of massive power concentration in a person’s 
hand who tends to behave in an opportunistic way in own benefit, such as corruption. 
This is where corruption, a fact on the daily news, is significant. Taking into account 
that research is presented in risk management terms and in the corporate government 
quality given the importance that the OECD (2004) gives: “The political leadership are 
now more aware of the good corporative government approach to the stability of 
financial markets, investments and economic growth. Enterprises are able to 
understand better up to what extent the good corporative government contributes to 
boost its competitiveness” which will be considered adequate when “they have the 
ideal people, with appropriate skills to supervise reviews and balance reports properly” 
(Gonzalez, 2010). 
As I mentioned before, one of the corporate government components is the property 
structure, defined as “the level of concentration that determines the power distribution 
and corporate control, or as the proportion of shares with a right to vote which are 
direct or indirect property of the family members or the senior management of the 
administration board, from now on CA” (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; quoted by Briano and 
Saavedra, 2014). Regards corruption, it is considered to be “the abuse of a position of 
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trust to obtain a dishonest benefit” which comes given by three conditioning factors: the 
opportunity, the benefit and the risk. The first one, is created when a person has too 
much power with not enough control. The second one, is given by the benefit given to 
the corrupt, and regards the risk, the probability of the corrupt act being detected, with 
its corresponding punishment. There is a great variety of types of corruption, among 
them, bribery, presents, commissions and favours, always when affecting the decision 
of whom perceives it (Argandoña, 2007).  
Important research on the effects of corruption in countries has been done, such as 
Nguyen and Van Dijk’s (2012) work, where effects of corruption in Vietnam are 
analysed differentiating between private and public enterprises, seeing the private ones 
as less harmed, even favoured. The idea established by many authors of corruption 
making economic growth difficult is corroborated (Agandoña, 2007; Nguyen and Van 
Dijk, 2012). Regulations and the quality of the government are key aspects in the level 
of corruption of a country, there is evidence on the different levels of corruption that 
come given by the policy carried out by the different local governments. 
Also, corruption has repercussions on the enterprises benefits, acting as a tax and 
reducing the efficiency levels. Although if seen form the corruption’s point of view as 
bribery, there are positive conclusions regards helping exportation and innovation. 
Among the main causes of using these practises it is talked about the obstacles from 
the governments that emphasize the previously named research (Nguyen and Van 
Dijk, 2012). Sharma and Mitra (2015), conclude that according to the complexity in the 
regulations of the system in bureaucratic terms there is more chance of bribery. 
Authors recommend to take action for policy, taxation and reforms.  
Regards the property structure, the family businesses face less severe agency 
problems derived from the separation between property and control, but bigger agency 
problems between controlling and minority shareholders. The absence of transparency 
in GC favours the integration of the family members in the CA, without the interference 
or disagreement of the minority shareholders. Thus, the minority shareholder’s concern 
about transparency in GC practises in family businesses, is reduced as these offer a 
superior financial performance (Ashiq, Chen and Suresh, 2007). The main problem 
comes the majority shareholders that control the administrative board conflict with the 
senior management or practise themselves as directives holding too much power with 
more moral risk (Mork et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008). 
Taking the property structure as a variable of corporate government into account, many 
different aspects may be noted that are relevant in the analysis. First, the concentration 
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of the property means a reduction in transparency of the enterprises and this means 
more opportunities to defraud, according to many authors the property into the hands 
of majority shareholders takes necessity of major government quality for minority 
shareholders. Thus, there is a positive link between the concentration of property and 
corruption (Vander and Willekens, 2008; Barako, Hancock and Izan, 2006 and Gandia, 
2008).  Empirically, through their study based on a test of average comparison, the 
authors have reached the conclusion that there is a significant difference between 
scattered and concentrated property. Second, works like Chen, Chen and Cheng 
(2008) defend that the family business tends to make profit of the benefits that offer a 
major outreach of information, and thus, property into the hands of family members 
provokes a major corporate transparency. On the contrary works like Bartholomeuzs 
and Tanewski’s (2006) defend that in family businesses the problem is between the 
controlling and minority shareholders. 
Basing the study on Spanish enterprises where the business fabric is composed mainly 
by small and medium enterprises, the property is expected to be concentrated, 
whereas the Spanish listed companies are characterized for being “typical of 
continental Europe countries different to the Anglo-Saxon model, is characterized by a 
very concentrated property into the hands of few controlling shareholders, very 
expanded cross ownership among dominant shareholders, slow change in property 
blocks of shares that have the control, and controlling market of enterprises not very 
operating due to the limited level of development of the capital markets (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 1998 and La Porta et al., 1999). To all this the limited protection that the 
company law confers to the investors and minority shareholders who have no control 
capacity and the presence of non dual organic structures must be added, in which one 
only administrative board performs both tasks supervisor and directive (De Miguel et 
al., 2004; De Andres et al., 2005) quoted by Sanchez, Baixauli and Lucas (2013).  
However, according to Garcia, Rodriguez and Castillo (2013) many factors have to be 
taken into account when determining the organisations property structure, such as the 
culture of the own country where the business is perceived as something to do with 
family and values of full dedication that have to be directed by them, when talking 
about a concentrated property. Owners adverse to risk act the same way. Another 
factor to take into account is in the explanation regards the difference between 
countries with scattered or concentrated property is the shareholders rights protection, 
as the lack of rights make the shareholders not claim shares. 
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Going from Jensen and Mecklin’s (1976) theory, a more scattered structure provokes 
more moral risk problems, whereas a concentrated structure avoids this problem, as 
there is no agent. Castillo (2012) establishes a comparison where the agent is the 
directive/owner that can have incentives to perform illicit activities and on the other 
hand, the principle that in this case are the supervising investors. The article poses as 
the main factor, the effectiveness of legal institutions raising the idea of the existence of 
an inverse relation between limited institutions effectiveness and the increase in the 
improper appropriation of resources. Thus, the article provides a base of the analysis to 
perform in the present work where it is intended to demonstrate the relation between 
the property structure of Spanish enterprises and corruption. 
Other previous research provide evidence of how the property structure affects a 
country’s growth (Garcia et al. 2013) concluding that those countries where the 
property is concentrated will lead to a country with less growth as there will be no 
incipient participation in the market values causing, among other matters, lack of 
finance.  
There is little empirical evidence of the relation between property structure and the 
level of corruption in the enterprises. This is why the significant level of the variables 
corruption and property structure will be analysed in the next section, and the relation 
between them will also be established.  
2.1. Hypothesis approach 
 
Four attributes are identified in property structure that can have an influence on the 
corruption level reached in 2005 by Spanish companies; the gender of the enterprise 
property, percentage of shares that the majority shareholders hold, number of majority 
shareholders and the incidence of the enterprises that put the State into corruption.1 
Hereafter, the hypothesis of the research that is going to be held:  
 
 
                                                 
1
 Other variables that can have a significant roll in the analysis are: the shareholder’s typology, 
to whether he or she is a foreign investor, from a family origin, financial institutions, state, 
among others. As well as, if the director is from individual or family origin. However, they have 
been left out to simplify the model, and because of the peculiarities of the sample and possible 
multicollinearity. 
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2.1.1. Women in business property  
  
According to the empiric study held by Frias et.al (2013), the presence of women in the 
administrative board has a positive effect in the implementation of policy against 
corruption and bribery and as a matter of fact, according to the quoted author basing 
his hypothesis in authors like Betz, O’Connell and Shepard (1989); Ibraim and 
Angelidis (1994); Stultz (1979) and Harrigan (1981), women are more moral and have 
more ethic behaviours and generally, the activities they are involved in are far from 
being lucrative, maybe having less perception of the organisation’s economic needs, 
and tending to ethic matters. Being his hypothesis useful and moving it to the woman’s 
roll in the enterprise property, the following hypothesis is established: 
 HYPOTHESIS 1 
The woman’s presence in the enterprise’s property gives rise to less probability to carry 
out a corruptive act in the business (this means, there is a negative relation between 
corruption and female owner).  
2.1.2. Percentage of shares that the majority shareholders own  
 
Regards concentration and scattered property, there has been a lot of research. Such 
as Garcia’s (2003) in which is stated that a concentrated property allows major 
management control and thus has better results, whereas it is difficult for a scattered 
property to carry out a proper control  because of the lack of agreements on decision 
taking. On the other hand, a concentrated property leads to a major power level that 
can lead directives to carry out contrary acts to the business ethics. Therefore, 
although the benefits that the property concentration reports because of allowing a 
better management control and thus of the benefits, it is obvious to establish that the 
relation between corruption and property concentration is positive. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is stated: 
HYPOTHESIS 2 
The major percentage of shares a shareholder may have (major property 
concentration), it is presumed that there is a higher tendency to corruption. There is a 
positive relation between the variable shares that the major shareholder represents and 
the enterprises corruption.   
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2.1.3. Number of majority shareholders 
 
As it is well mentioned previously, the agency problem between property and control 
nowadays goes further than and focuses on the problems between the majority and 
minority shareholders. Problem which arises due to the conflicts of interests among 
shareholders. In the present section, the supervision problem is introduced. According 
to Diez, Garcia and Lopez (2013), there is a tendency toward the assumption of risk, 
from the controlling shareholder’s side, in exchange of profitability. When there is an 
opportunity to grow, the shareholders with major control are less adverse to risk and 
decide to invest in order to obtain a major profitability and generate value to the 
business. However, when the majority shareholder has not enough control this one 
needs the rest of the shareholders support. This involves a more distributed business 
supervision among shareholders that avoids the main shareholder to carry out actions 
of opportunism. On the contrary, when the shareholders of major control have too 
much power, the problem of who sustains who arises, because of the influence these 
can have on the administrative board. Works of authors like La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer 
and Vishny (2001); Burkart and Panuzi (2001) focus on the power problem that these 
have on the minority shareholders in own interest. According to Hu and Izumida (2008) 
and Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010); quoted by Diez, Garcia and Lopez “the relation 
between the supervision capacity and expropriation possibility is conditioned by the 
property participation of the main shareholders”. The same way, other studies 
introduce the same supervision problem (Steinherr and Huveeners (1990); quoted by 
Garcia (2003). 
According to what previously established, the reasoning means that the more majority 
shareholders the enterprises have, and if these have enough influence to act on their 
own, it is more likely for them to carry out own benefit acts and thus contribute to 
corruption, as they should all agree on their criminal activity.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is stated: 
HYPOTHESIS 3: 
The number of majority shareholders has a negative relation with corruption.  
2.1.4. The enterprises sales to governments or state agencies 
It is obvious to think that there can be a relation among the enterprises that have sales 
with the governments and the public workers. Among one of the questions to consider 
is the bribery the employees can accept in exchange for the contract to be done. This 
way, the employer achieves the work and the employee has an extra amount of 
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money. A way of supporting this statement is through Hellmann and Kaufmann’s work 
(2001), in which they talk about the influence the enterprises have on the State’s 
powers when fixing laws to obtain advantages, generally, barriers to the competence, 
in exchange for unofficial payments to public employees. Spanish companies, more 
specifically multinational companies have made the most of their capacities to 
negotiate with the local governments obtaining important benefits (Jimenez, Duran and 
de la Fuente, 2011). 
Knowing that it does not mean to influence legislation but for the contract to be 
accepted by the administration, it is true that it would make sense to take it to this 
interpretation.  
If on the other hand, the roll of public enterprises is established on the achievement of 
certain sales of goods or service delivery, a more direct relation is foreseen, as the 
occasions to be corrupt are more and the consequences if spotted are minor (North, 
1990). However, given the lack of public enterprises that have taken part in the 
analysed questionnaire, it is not suitable to distinguish.  
HYPOTHESIS 4: 
The enterprises that sell to the State tend to be more corrupt than the ones that do not, 
therefore it is established that there is a positive relation between the enterprises who 
sell a percentage to the governments and the level of corruption in the business fabric. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In the present section, the methodology carried out for the study is defined. First, the 
data source is specified. Second, the tools used to carry out the analysis are described. 
And last, the variables and the model to study are established.  
3.1. Data processing 
 
The data is from Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World 
Bank, made in 2005 for the Spanish enterprises case. The sample consists of 606 
Spanish enterprises that present information regards the sector that the studied sample 
works on. The questionnaire focuses on different topics of the financial environment 
such as access to finance, commercial (regards exportation), governmental (regards 
legal barriers), corruption, property structure composition, competence levels, clients 
solvency, bargaining power with suppliers, etc. Among different matters to be 
considered, there is the possibility of bias, as it involves a small subset of the public 
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sector enterprises, participating therefore enterprises that operate in the private sector. 
This is why, interesting variables to include in the model have been dismissed because 
of the low participation level in the public enterprises questionnaire. Regards the 
number of observations taken into account in the models2 that are going to be 
considered, we have 507 observations for model 1 and 470 observations for model 2. 
The reason why the number of the sample is reduced to the mentioned observations is 
because of the absence of answers from the enterprises in the considered variables, 
which is a reason for exclusion. 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Sample and data collection  
The method used to collect and then process is divided in two parts. On the one hand, 
we have a descriptive analysis of the variables subject of study. On the other hand, a 
quantitative research approach will be carried out through two regression models, in 
which it is intended to analyse the relations between the variables adopting, therefore, 
an explanatory approach. In both models the explanatory variables significance is 
contrasted. Whilst for model 2 the contrast will be done with the statistic F, for model 3 
it will be analysed through Person distribution. The reason for this last one is the 
necessity of transforming certain variables into discrete.  
The models could present multicollinearity problems that have been taken into account 
when determining the model variable, excluding those variables that could present 
problems. 
3.3.  Dependent variable 
 
In this section the subject study dependent variable is described, corruption. The goal 
is to measure the perception people who have done the questionnaire have about the 
level of corruption in Spain. Being two variables representative that will lead to two 
models that will try to explain its relation in such a way that it will be possible to do a 
comparison. 
The variable (i) Payments refers to the irregular/additional or presents payment 
frequency that the enterprises of their business line have to make to the workers 
regards taxes, permits, regulations, services, etc. The variable is expressed in a 
ranking taking values between 1 and 7, where 1 is never and 6 always (7 has been 
removed because the enterprise did not know if acts like this were carried out). The 
                                                 
2
 The models will be defined in section 3.5. Model specification. 
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second dependent variable defined as (ii) Contract refers to the percentage of the 
contract that they pay to the government when they do contracts with them or the 
percentage of the value that the presents represent.  
3.4. Independent and control variables 
 
The following variables are considered determining in the property structure for the 
enterprises that have done the questionnaire, over which previous hypothesis have 
been established according to previous literature. First, the gender of the owner of the 
business is included, Ownergender, being a binary variable taking value 1 if it is a 
woman and 0 if it is a man, considered therefore a dummy variable3. Second, the 
percentage of shares that the majority shareholders own of each one of the businesses 
that have done the questionnaire is taken into account (%largestshare). Third, the 
number of majority shareholders that own the percentage of previous shares 
(numberlargest) is gathered. Last, one of the variables considered relevant in the study 
is represented by the percentage of sales intended for the government or state 
agencies (Government).  
At the same time, two control variables have been included in order to gather specific 
features of the organisations in the study. On one hand, a binary variable is included, 
named dummy, which represents the manufacturing industry sector 
(s_manufacturing_dummy). The database classifies the enterprises according to the 
sector in which they operate. Given the number of enterprises that belong to the 
manufacturing sector and given the logistic process that the products require, sub-
products and raw materials in purchases and sales where the probability of generating 
fake purchases and sales is less than in services enterprises, it has been considered 
crucial in the analysis. The variable has value 1 if it is an enterprise from the 
manufacturing sector and 0 if it is from another sector. Secondly, the size of the 
business is taken into account, expressed in number of employees. The values the 
variable gathers go from 1 to 3, being 1 for enterprises with 2 to 49 employees and 
thus considered a small business. Value 2 is for enterprises with 50 to 249 employees, 
considered a medium business. And last, value 3 is for big enterprises with 250 to 9999 
employees.  
 
                                                 
3
 The variable to study has a limitation the owner can be 1 or more, in the case of being more 
than 1 they can be man and woman. However, the questionnaire only allows one unique 
response. Therefore, it is considered that the chosen gender in each enterprise is the most 
important one in the organisation 
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3.5. Model specification  
 
In order to determine the impact or the seriousness of the Spanish enterprises 
corruption, two relations have been established between different variables so that 
according to them the level of influence of the property structure on corruption can be 
determined.  
The general model used is a multivariate regression model: 
Y = X*βi + Z*γi + µi     (1)  
Where; X is the property structure variable as a corporate government variable, Z 
gathers the control variables, Y represents the impact of the enterprises on the 
corruption level and µ is the error term.  
 
As mentioned previously, the model will be estimated around 2 proxies, “payments” 
and “contract” so that a comparison can be done with the extracted results. Therefore, 
the models to be estimated are the following: 
Contract = β0 + β1*% largestshare + β2*numberlargest + β3*s_manufacturing_dummy 
+ β4*Government + β5*ownergender + β6*size + µ         (2) 
 
Payments = β0 + β1*% largestshare + β2*numberlargest + 
β3*s_manufacturing_dummy + β4*Government + β6*ownergender + β7*size + µ         
(3) 
Where µ is the error term and β0 is the constant term. 
In order to contrast the significance for the variables of each one of the models 
independently (2 and 3), two hypothesis contrasts will be done. For model 2, a 
hypothesis contrast is established with the statistic F, characterised for being a multiple 
linear regression analysis. Whereas for model 3 (logit model), the analysis of 
significance has been carried out through Pearson’s distribution function, chi2 (X2) that 
represents the goodness of fit. When the model to be estimated has quality dependent 
variables, then we turn to a discrete choice model. As Medina (2003) explains “The 
usefulness of the discrete choice models versus traditional econometrics lies in the fact 
that the first ones allow the modelling of qualitative variables, using techniques for 
discrete variables. It is said that a variable is discrete when is consists of a finite 
number of alternatives that measure qualities. This characteristic requires codification 
as a previous step to modelling, a process through which the alternatives of the 
variables turn into codes or quantic values, susceptible of being modelled using 
econometrics techniques.” 
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Specifically, the mentioned model is of multiple reply with organised data as it gathers 
more than two values, contrarily to models with dichotomous reply. The model gathers 
the probability of observing a result, for the individual I, corresponds to the probability 
of the linear function, together with the random error, to be within the interval of the 
estimated cutting points. With this, values within 0 and 1, 1 and 2, 2 and 3 and so on 
are considered. 
4. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
In the present section the results of the descriptive analysis are shown. Then, the 
results obtained from the multivariate analysis are presented done through and 
estimation of Ordinary least squares, from now on OLS4, for model 2 and Generalized 
least squares, from now on GLS5, for model 3 catalogued as Ordered logit model.  
4.1. Descriptive analysis  
 
The following table, 1 show the descriptive analysis results developed through a 
statistic summary. It contributes evidence of the corruption level that the Spanish 
enterprises stand together with their property structure. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the target study variables 
VARIABLE 
(PROXY) 
Mean S.D. Min. 25th P. Median 75th P. Max. 
Size 1.369 0.647 1 1 1 2 3 
S_manufactuin
g_dummy 
 
0.221 0.415 0 0 0 0 1 
Ownergender 0.341 0.474 0 0 0 1 1 
Numberlargest 1.723 1.743 1 1 1 2 25 
X.largestshare 
(Percentage) 
69.84 30.06 1 50 66 100 100 
Contract 0.306 1.642 0 0 0 0 15 
Government 2.713 11.48 0 0 0 0 100 
Payments 1.558 0.996 1 1 1 2 6 
The table shows the descriptive statistics of the variables under study. 
Source: Own preparation.  
                                                 
4
 For the accomplishment of the estimation of OSL some assumptions must be accepted, 
established by Gauss-Marakov: Linearity in parameters, random sampling, zero conditioned 
average, non perfect collinearity and homocedasticidad. If assumptions are accomplished, OSL 
is the best estimator (Medina, 2003). 
5 In the discrete choosing models, the estimation by OSL entails some problems that can be 
solved through the estimator GLS (Medina, 2003). 
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4.1.1. Explanatory variables  
To start, the results of the explanatory variables will be detailed, being also 
representative of corruption.  
Referring to the variable contract, in average term the Spanish enterprises that did the 
questionnaire pay 0,31% of their contracts to the employees for irregular payments or 
representative of the value in presents. It represents quite a high value, if it is 
considered as a percentage of profitability and if the number of present observations 
are considered, being the maximum value 15% the value of the contract for bribe. It 
has to be taken into account that the value will always depend on the value of the 
contract which could be a significant quantity when talking about contracts with 
voluminous numbers and on the contrary with small numbers. 
Regards the variable payments, with 1,56 average value, the enterprises state that in 
average term they hardly ever (between never and seldom) do payments for presents 
for permits, taxes, regulations, services in own interests… Proof that Spanish 
companies do not tend to corruptive acts.  
4.1.2. Explained variables 
Hereafter are the explained variables analysed representative of variables that 
commonly refer to the property structure.  
First, the variable Government produces a 2,71% average value, this percentage 
expresses the quantity that the enterprises give to sales in the public administration. As 
is noticeable it is a low value, which means that the enterprises give most of their sales 
or service delivery to private enterprises or final consumers. However, those 
enterprises that give part of their sales to the government, which percentage is 
significant, among them the highest value reached is 100%, should be named.  
Secondly, the variable numberlargest is described. In average values, the number of 
majority shareholders that own the companies is 1,71, so the decisions the majority 
shareholders make could be supervised by the rest of investors inasmuch as there is 
more than one majority shareholder reducing their power capacity and reducing the 
occasions of being corrupt. Such an interpretation will be valid as long as the 
shareholders do not hold 100% of the shares or a percentage that may offer most of 
the company’s control, in that case the rest of shareholders will lake supervision power 
to control them. As minimum value, data show that there are enterprises that have one 
majority shareholder and a maximum value of 25 majority shareholders.  In this last 
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case, the occasions of being corrupt are reduced because everyone’s coalition is 
required to carry out a fraudulent action. 
Regards the variable ownergender, we can see in average terms a 0,34 value. Such 
value explains that, there are generally more men owners than women, as it is close to 
0. As it is a binominal variable that takes on value 1 if the property is woman and 0 if it 
is man6. 
Last, the variable X.largestshare expresses the percentage that majority shareholders 
have of each enterprise. In average term, these own a 69,84% of the shares. Such 
percentage explains that in general the companies that did the questionnaire have 
majority shareholders with high control power in the organisation. The maximum 
percentage is 100% and the lowest is 1%. 
4.1.3. Control variables 
The variable s_manufacturing_dummy, offers an average data of 0,22 which means 
that nearly a quarter of the enterprises that did the questionnaire operate in the 
manufacturing sector. The reason for choosing this variable is because of the high 
number of enterprises that operate in the manufacturing sector. 
Regards the variable size, in average term the enterprises that took part in the 
questionnaire are in the second interval, between 50 employees and 249. As they 
produce a 1,37 value and calculating, in average term the enterprises that were 
involved in the questionnaire are medium size with around 169 employees. 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
 
The obtained results are shown in table 2. As a comparison the results of the estimated 
models have also been established. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 As mentioned previously, the limitation that the variable presents is a result of the following 
assumption: the reply of the enterprises to the property structure has been given taking the 
most representative person in the organisation into account in the cases where there is more 
than one owner and with diverse gender.    
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Table 2. Summary table of explanatory models of the level of corruption in 
Spain 
Dependent  
variable  
Model 2 
Contract 
Model 3 
Payments 
Independent  
variable 
Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
P-value Coef. 
(Std. Err.) 
P-value 
Size 
-0.025 0.854 -0.198 0.306 
(0.137) 
 
(0.193) 
 
S_manufacturing_dummy -0.057 0.750 -0.548 0.038** 
(0.178) 
 
(0.264) 
 
Ownergender -0.096 0.529 -0.173 0.421 
(0.153) 
 
(0.214) 
 
Numberlargest 0.300 0.000*** -0.139 0.255 
(0.079)    
 
(0.122) 
 
Largestshare 0.005  0.145 -0.011 0.014** 
(0.003)           (0.004) 
 
Government -0.001 0.866 0.017 0.075* 
(0.008)       
 
(0.010) 
 
Cons. 
 
-0.438 0.286 
  
(0.410) 
   Number of obs. 507 470 
F 0.012 --- 
CHI2/X
2
 --- 0.04 
 
The table reports regression results of corruption using two models. The first model refers to 
the percentage of the contract that the companies use to pay the government. The second 
model shows the frequency of use of payments to officials. 
(1) Standard errors are in brackets.  
(2) *, **, *** denotes to be significant at 10% (p<0.10*), 5% (p<0.05*) and 1% level (p<0.01***), 
respectively. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
 
Model 2 produces a 0.012 P-value for the F statistic, so for a 5% and 10% significance 
level the null hypothesis is rejected, and it is concluded that taking the critical value as 
a statistic, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (NH) when is true is 1.16% 
and thus the error probability is tiny (type I error). This is why that the alternative error 
has been accepted (H1), that leads to accept that the independent variables explain 
the model. 
Once seen that the variables all together explain the model, it is needed to determine 
which variables are significant to certain levels of confidence and what the relation is 
with the explanatory variable. The variables that have an influence on corruption in 
model 2 is only one, numerlargest, this one represents the number of majority 
shareholders that each enterprise has. The number of majority shareholders is 
representative of corruption, with a 0.000 p-value (to a 90%, 95% and 99% confidence 
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level). According to the 0.300 coefficient that it produces, there is a positive relation 
between the number of majority shareholders that an enterprise has and corruption. 
This leads to the following argument: the more shareholders with more control the 
companies have the higher the levels of corruption will be in these enterprises, 
basically because of the power held, which although is scattered among shareholders 
with major control, is concentrated in shareholders with enough power to have an 
influence on the administrative board, supervising body. (The model tries to explain the 
following: as the number of majority shareholders increases to 1, the level of corruption 
increases to 0.300), meaning that if the majority shareholders have the capacity of 
agreeing to be corrupt, it will carry out more opportunistic acts. Regards non significant 
variables we have: size of the enterprise, gender of the owner of the majority 
shareholders, the percentage of sales to the government and the manufacturing sector.  
In view of the obtained results, hypothesis 3 established previously is rejected. As the 
result obtained for the variable numberlargest, negative relation between corruption 
and lack of supervision, is different to the established in hypothesis 3. This hypothesis 
stated that, the bigger the number of majority shareholders is, the bigger the necessity 
of joining up to be corrupt is and thus the bigger the difficulty to carry out these acts. 
However, the obtained evidence holds that the major number of majority shareholders 
the companies have, the higher the levels of corruption will be, therefore the empirical 
evidence does not support the hypothesis.    
Model 3, logit model, expresses a 0.04 probability for the chi2 statistic. With it, to a 5% 
and 10% significance level it is concluded that there is a significance of all the 
explained variables together. The models reveals that the variables which have 
significant effects in this case are two independent variables and one control variable.  
Regards the explained variables that have an effect on regression, we have: 
- The percentage of sales to governments (Government), with a 0.075 p-value 
(significant p=0.10). The sign of the obtained coefficient is positive, this means 
that forefront the one percent increase in sales to governments the level of 
corruption will increase 0.075%. Evidence shows that the implication of the 
governments in the private enterprises leads to higher levels of corruption.  
- The percentage of shares that the majority shareholders own (X.largestshare), 
has obtained a 0.014 p-value accepted to a 95% and 90% trust level. In this 
case the relation is inverse, the higher percentage the majority shareholders 
own the lower the levels of corruption will be.  
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Going on with the analysis the accepted hypothesis of model 3 in the study should be 
determined.  
- Within the variables that have a significant influence in the hypothesis of model 
4 associated to the sales to state agencies, it has been accepted, because as 
previous evidence shows, Hellman and Kaufmann (2001); Jimenez et al. 
(2011), certain enterprises have negotiation capacity to influence in the 
government decisions in exchange for accepting unofficial payments. 
- Hypothesis 2 related to the percentage of shares that the majority shareholders 
own has a significant influence but according to the hypothesis stated in the 
study it can be rejected, as the previously established relation was positive and 
the result of the regression is negative. The obtained results give more support 
to Garcia’s previous study (2003), in which she states that a concentrated 
property structure leads to a major directive control contrarily to a scattered 
property. The concentrated property, as the author explains, allows to reach 
agreements in a more effective way. 
Finally, the control variable that is significant in the model is the one referred to the 
manufacturing sector with a negative relation, this means, those enterprises that 
operate in the manufacturing sector have less influence on corruption. One of the 
possible explanations could be that, the manufacturing sector in Spain is characterized 
by enterprises with a number of employees lower than 10, in the 83,4% of the totality of 
enterprises that the sector is composed of (Europa press, 2016). As dealing with small 
enterprises they may act simultaneously as owners and directives. It is therefore an 
absolute concentration and it is not good for the organisation to be corrupted regards 
reputation. Also, according to the definition of corruption7 the size has an influence on 
corruption. Although in a certain way, the benefit they obtain can “compensate”, 
regards the impulse that some bribery can offer the enterprise, the cost it has if the act 
is spotted. However, the evidence obtained shows that in Spain, the enterprises that 
operate in the manufacturing sector have a negative influence on corruption.  
5. CONCLUSIONS 
  
Corruption, characterized by being currently present, is one of the concerns taken into 
account by public bodies and the society in general. It is used as a mean to obtain 
benefit, such as, the obtaining a contract, a permit or to restrict the access to the 
competence, in exchange for the bribery to public institutions. The act is carried out 
                                                 
7
 Previously defined in the theoretical framework. 
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because there is an opportunity that, focused on the enterprise’s area, it focuses on the 
property structure understanding this one as a scattered property and a concentrated 
property in hands of majority shareholders. The last parameter that is part of the 
corruption concept is the risk, understood as the probability of being detected and 
penalized for it.  
Generally, corruption is carried out because of the power concentration in the property, 
together with the attractiveness of the benefit to obtain and the absence of risk of being 
spotted.    
Previous literature shows that corporate transparency is a mean to create business 
value but there is more to it, the enterprises that are more transparent tend to be less 
corrupt. The decision on the transparency levels leads to agency problems, where the 
owners interests are different to the directives ones, but the real problem is within the 
little power the minority shareholders have in comparison to the excess of power the 
majority owners may have, who sometimes carry out own benefit actions. A 
concentrated structure leads to a minor necessity of transparency, and consequently 
leads to major levels of corruption in the enterprise. 
Previous literature emphasizes in both positive and negative aspects regards the 
composition of the property structure involved in corruption. Although it is true that the 
implementation of corporate government measures, together with and adequate 
management of the business risk and the policy setting of social responsibility is 
essential for the control and reduction of corruption, legal regulations are also needed, 
specially protection measures for minority shareholders, that will act against corruption. 
These legal regulations are a key technique to reduce the corruption of a country. 
In the present study, the relation between the property structure as a variable of 
corporate government and the level of corruption in Spanish enterprises is analysed, 
for a sample of 606 enterprises, in the period of 2005. Two explanatory models are 
presented that link both variables in such a way that there is more than one result 
regards the achieved study.  
The results obtained reveal that there is a significant relation between the composition 
of the property structure and the level of corruption in Spain.  
The results obtained for model 2 indicate that, the bigger the number of majority 
shareholders the higher percentage of the contract they give to irregular payments and 
the bigger the influence in corruption levels is. There is a positive relation between the 
supervision capacity among majority and minority shareholders and corruption. Among 
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other causes that explain the result obtained we have Hu and Izumida (2008) and 
Bennedsen and Nielsen’s work (2010); quoted by Diaz, Garcia and Lopez (2013) in 
which the conducting string focuses on the supervision capacity according to the 
majority shareholder’s participation in the organisation. Therefore, the obtained 
empirical evidence after estimating model 2, does not support the stated hypothesis. 
Regards the hypothesis that have no incidence in the study, as there are no significant 
results according to the established trust levels8, we have: percentage of majority 
shareholders, sales to the governments and the woman’s roll in property. Whereas the 
non significant control variables are size of the business and the manufacturing sector.  
Regards model 3, the conclusions have been more varied being able to accept a 
hypothesis and considering a control variable relevant. Basically, the achieved results 
indicate that private enterprises that operate with public agencies tend to bribe. This 
statement contrasts hypothesis 4 which is also supported by many authors such as 
Hellman and Kaufmann (2001). The results prove the negative relation between the 
percentage of shareholders that an enterprise has, the concentration of the property 
and the frequency with which the enterprise carries out payments or gives presents to 
the employees.  These are more frequent when a shareholder owns less shares. The 
descriptive data describe that in average term the shareholders with major control own 
69%, which makes us think that in Spain the enterprises have a concentrated structure, 
according to (Cuervo-Carruza, 1998 and La Porta et al., 1999; quoted by Sanchez, 
Baixauli and Lucas (2013)). However, the hypothesis has not been accepted as its 
approach is inverse.  
On the other hand, the manufacturing sector in Spain presents an inverse relation with 
corruption, this sector represents a quarter of the enterprises that did the questionnaire 
and is a sector characterized for having less than 10 employees. Therefore, it is 
concluded that these enterprises act in a more ethical way.  
In both models there is evidence that shows a relation between property and 
corruption. Although it is true that, the frequency in which payments to employees are 
carried out (model 3) is not determined by the proportion of shares that the investors 
own, there is evidence that shows that these payments increase as the contracting 
relations do with the public entities. Also, with model 2 there is evidence on the positive 
relation between the number of majority shareholders, this means property 
concentration, and the percentage of the contract that goes to unofficial payments. All 
in all, there is a significant relation between the property structure and corruption levels.  
                                                 
8
 Statistically significant levels are 1%, 5% y 10%. 
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The present work has diverse limitations that could be dealt with in future research. 
First, the participation of public enterprises in the study is very small, therefore it would 
be interesting to bring in a selective sample in the future that would allow to show the 
differences in corruption level between private and public enterprises. Second, the 
obtained data goes back to 2005, a previous date to the current crisis, although the 
data base did not offer updated data, it would be interesting to compare them with the 
nowadays data as corruption cases are happening very often. Third, a hypothesis over 
the influence of women in the business property in terms of business ethics is 
established, however only one owner is taken into account. Future research could 
analyse the effect of more than one owner. Last, one of the study’s limitations that has 
made the process more difficult has been obtaining information about corruption.  
To end, to determine the effectiveness of the corporate government system it would be 
interesting to analyse in the future the relation between the committees, the 
administrative board and the corporate fraud. As an adequate management of the risk 
will come given by the composition of the administrative board and the formation of 
committees. One of the most important rolls is the independent advisor’s roll, the 
separation between the president and the CEO and the auditory committee for being 
one of the committees that enjoys independence, capacity and competence to manage 
risk in and adequate way. The same way, the corporate fraud is a variable with 
absence of interpretation given the difficulties to obtain the information considered 
interesting for future investigations.  
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